"It's eastern Congo. If it were not the M23 killing people it would be some other armed groups"—Susan Rice, US Ambassador to the UN (source)
Illustration 1, below, unequivocally demonstrates that most of the Congo's known tin, copper, gold, coltan, coal and uranium deposits are scattered along the nation's eastern border:
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| Illustration 1 (click on illustration to zoom in) |
Otherwise put, Illustration 1 adds a bit more texture to the point that Susan Rice was trying to put across in the quote that opened this post. Rice's point can be crudely put as follows:
Congo will forever be inundated by a tidal wave of savage marauders who desire to pillage her natural resource wealth.
Therefore, it is reasonable to assert that peace initiatives that fail to factor-in this grim reality are doomed to fail (abysmally).
Illustration 2, below, chronicles the mineral-wealth-driven conflicts that plagued the Congo's history:
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| Illustration 2 (download for a better view) |
This all begs the following questions:
- Will the Congo ever be a stable country?
- How can the Congo use its mineral wealth to lift its people out of poverty?
Interestingly enough, the approach consists of just four broad steps. They can be summed as follows, and I quote:
- "Identification of every individual or group with a meaningful interest in trying to influence the outcome".
- "Estimation, as accurately as possible and with the available information, of what policy each of the players identified in point 1 is advocating when they talk in private to each other—that is, what do they say they want".
- "Approximation of how big an issue this is for each of the players—that is, how salient is it to them. Are they so concerned that they would drop whatever they’re doing to address this problem when it comes up, or are they likely to want to postpone discussions while they deal with more pressing matters?"
- Answering this question: "Relative to all of the other players, how influential can each player be in persuading others to change their position on the issue?"
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...Who has a Meaningful Interest in the Congo? What do they say they Want?
Table 1 below expositions the entities that have meaningful interest in the DRC, and, it briefly discusses what they say they want:
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| Table 1 (click on table to zoom in) |
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| Table 2 (click on table to zoom in) |
From Tables 1 and 2, it is apparent that the entities that have "meaningful interest" in the DRC's stability are: Rwanda; Mobutuists; Angola; the SADC; Hutu Militia; Uganda; Banyamulenge; Aid Organizations and The International Community; The Kabila Government; Kabila-era Entrepreneurs, and; Multitudinous Rebel Groups.
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...What are the Positions of the Entities in Tables 1 and 2?
Illustration 3, below, depicts the Congo Stability Issue continuum; starting from the most radical positions (held by the entities in Tables 1 and 2), and gradually moving to the more conservative positions:
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| Illustration 3 (download for a better view) |
Therefore, the positions of the entities that were discussed in Tables 1 and 2 can be abbreviated as follows:
- A Stable Mobutuist Government: The Hutu Militia and Mobutuists.
- A Stable Rwandan / Uganda Surrogate Government: Rwanda and Uganda.
- A Stable Democratically Elected Government: Aid Organizations and the International Community.
- A Coalition Government with Substantial Concessions: Multitudinous Rebel Groups.
- A Coalition Government with Moderate Concessions: SADC and Angola.
- A Coalition Government with Limited Concessions: The Kabila Government.
- A Kabila Dictatorship: Kabila-era entrepreneurs.
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...How Powerful are the Stakeholders? How focused are they on the Congo Issue?
Table 3 is a relative ranking of the power, and, salience (i.e. a measure of how intensely they are focused on the Congo Issue) of the entities that were discussed in Tables 1 and 2:
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| Table 3 (click on table to zoom in) |
If you ignore the potential of a veto and plug the Power and Salience data that was presented in Table 3, and, the Position data that was presented in Illustration 3, into the de Mesquita prediction model [1]; it tells you that the next Congolese government would be a hybrid of a government in which Joseph Kabila makes substantial concessions to the multitudinous Congolese rebel groups, and, a democratically elected government. Otherwise put, this implies that Joseph Kabila would:
- Be stepping down as president of the DRC in the very near future. And, he would probably get a popular person, like Moïse Katumbi Chapwe, to stand in as his party's representative in the next presidential election. Before he does this, he would first purge all members of his party who rigidly hold on to the notion that he should stay in power and make limited concessions to the rebel groups (Kabila will do this to guarantee his party a victory in the next presidential election, which would give it legitimacy). However, this does not imply that he would completely vanish from the political scene; he could probably stay on as the chairman of his party, or, as the minister of defence.
- Give the Banyamulenge their land, expropriated property, and award them the full rights and privileges of Congolese citizens. He will do this to neutralize their hostilities.
Random Comment: Truth be told, this output sounds too bizarre to be plausible! It certainly is not what I was expecting.
FYI: Without the veto input, the model has an accuracy rate of around 70%, so take this output seriously, but do retain a modicum of scepticism. The model also assumes that all the entities in question, especially Joseph Kabila, are rational. [2]
If this prediction obtains, the power that buttressed five different positions would be consolidated as is shown in Illustration 4 below:
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| Illustration 4 (click on illustration to zoom in) |
This would create a coalition with a power level of 57% (or 68% if the reparations succeed in winning the loyalty and support of the Banyamulenge) - which would enable the Congolese government to engineer outcomes and create lasting peace.
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...The Engineered Roadmap to Peace
"The fact is that a man who wants to act virtuously in every way necessarily comes to grief among so many who are not virtuous."—Niccolo Machiavelli
Illustration 5, below, expositions the actions that the Congolese government could take to create a more secure environment for ordinary Congolese citizens (i.e. after the realignment of power has taken place):
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| Illustration 5 (download for a better view) |
The actions in Illustration 5 can be expounded as follows:
Step 1: Bring the Mobutuists on Board
The Mobutuists and the leaders of the Hutu Militia have the following links: 1) they collaborated when Mobutu and Habyarimana were still in power, and; 2) they would both benefit from a stable Mobutuist government coming into power. Briefly stated: they have a history of collaborating and they currently have common interests. Therefore, there is the risk that the more extreme members of the Mobutuist camp would ally themselves with the Hutu Militia, and collaborate to destabilize Rwanda and The Congo.
To neutralize this threat, Kabila could bring them on board. The benefits of bringing the Mobutuists on board can be summed as follows:
- They are entrepreneurial, have "capital" and understand the Congolese business environment. Otherwise put, they are the ideal investors for the DRC.
- Some of the generals in the Mobutuist camp were trained in Belgium and France and their skills could bolster the strategic ranks of the Congolese army.
- Bringing them on board would increase the power of the Kabila coalition from 57%, in Illustration 4, to at least 67%, which would bolster its ability to shape outcomes.
Would the Mobutuists be willing to join Kabila? My answer to this question would be: yes. According to Jason Stearns's narrative of the formation of the MLC by Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo; when Bemba established the MLC, Mobutuist generals (and politicians) regularly met with members of the Rwandan elite in Kigali to discuss possible 'avenues of collaboration' [3]. By and large, Mobutuist generals dislike the current Rwandan elites very much [7], and these meetings signal desperation for power. Succinctly put: they would be amenable to collaborating with Kabila - it would give them relevance!
Step 2: Give Eastern Mineral Concessions to American, Belgian, French and British Firms
Illustration 1 unequivocally demonstrates that the majority of the DRC's mineral resources lie along its eastern frontier. To bolster the security of the eastern frontier, the Kabila government could give eastern mineral concessions to old-line American, Belgian, French and British mining houses [4]. (Obviously, this has to be done under an equitable joint venture arrangement with the Congolese government).
Naturally, these firms would make their own private security arrangements, i.e. they would hire the best "soldiers of fortune", to protect their investments. Further, the British, French, Belgian and American governments would be amenable to contributing troops to protect the investments of their citizens. Clearly, this would, in effect, create an eastern security buffer zone that would: 1) Prevent rebels from tapping the Congo's mineral wealth and using it to fund conflicts, and; 2) Curtail the encroachment of any invading forces (all invading forces in the Congo launch their attacks from the east).
Step 3: Build a Formidable Military Apparatus
Ever the consummate strategist, Mobutu Sese Seko deliberately kept the Zairian military weak; he did this to mitigate the threat of a coup. This militaristic weakness is a legacy that the Kabila government needs to rid itself of, i.e. if it wants to foster greater stability.
To bolster the military of the Congo, the Kabila government would need to:
- Build a well-trained and well-equipped coast guard and "navy" that would patrol Lake Kivu and nip any amphibious threats in the bud.
- Build autonomous aerial surveillance and attack capabilities that would enable it to monitor and eradicate rebel activity in the Kivu area and the Rwenzori Mountain range.
- Acquire nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. To expound, there was a reason why Saddam Hussein told the world that he had weapons of mass destruction when he didn't: he did it to deter internal and external forces from seizing power violently. [5] Thus, it is reasonable to assert that nuclear and biological weapons would raise the costs of invading the Congo, and, adversely alter the cost-benefit calculus of invasion.
Step 4: Enter into Tourism Joint ventures with Uganda, South Sudan and Rwanda
In his text which is entitled The Predictioneer's Game, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita demonstrates that tourism is a rewarding economic activity that is highly sensitive to incidents of violence.
To mitigate the risk of conflict with neighbouring countries, the Congolese government could start a transnational gorilla (specifically bonobos) conservancy, on its eastern frontier, in partnership with the Rwandan, South Sudanese and Ugandan Governments.
In such a scenario, if a conflict occured on its eastern frontier, the revenue loss for the Rwandan, Ugandan, and South Sudanese governments would be great. In the specific cases of the Rwandan and Ugandan governments, i.e. governments that are heavily subsidized by economically troubled donors (to the tune of 40% to 50% of their respective budgets), this revenue loss would trigger severe austerity pains that would have consequences that are too disconcerting to fathom.
Clearly, the abovementioned tourism joint venture would incent Rwanda and Uganda to foster the stability of the Congo, and, it would also disincentivize them from sponsoring rebel forces that would distabilize the Congo.
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As for the young men who belong to the alphabet soup of rebel groups that roam the rainforests; they could be demobilized, rehabilitated, retrained and employed as "neighbourhood protection police" who would work alongside traditional chiefs, or the Mwamis, to enforce the rule of law in their communities.
For this approach to yield tangible results, the Congolese government would have to pay these young men multiples of the Congolese minimum wage. This approach could have the impact that it had in Iraq. In The Predictioneer's Game, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita reflected, and I quote:
"The United States operates the Concerned Local Citizens program in Iraq. Following the alphabet-soup tradition so beloved by the Pentagon, the Iraqis participating in this program are known as CLCs. CLCs help guard neighborhoods against insurgents. They are paid ten dollars a day for their service. It doesn’t seem as if there is anything crass or overly materialistic about that. But then we should pause to ask, who are these CLCs and what, exactly, are we buying for ten dollars a day?
These concerned Iraqis are not your ordinary neighborhood watch group. They are not the folks next door who give school kids a safe place to go when their parents are at work. They are not the friends who have your house key, water your plants, take in your mail, and feed your cat while you’re on vacation. No, they’re former anti-American insurgents, tens of thousands of them. Some of them, in fact, used to belong to al-Qaeda. It would seem that they were among the most fanatic of fanatics, the worst of the worst. And yet for a measly ten bucks a day these supposedly unshakable al-Qaeda terrorists now act like allies of the United States, serving as our very own paramilitaries, helping to keep violence down in mostly Sunni neighborhoods, defending the peace that they used to shatter for a living. How can this be? How can terrorists be so easily converted into our friends and protectors?
As it happens, being an ex-insurgent employed as a CLC is a very good job by Iraqi standards. At ten dollars a day, CLCs can earn a few thousand dollars a year from the United States, plus, of course, whatever extra they make on the side. The average Iraqi, despite that country’s huge oil wealth, earns only about six dollars a day, almost half what a CLC gets! Those who think that terrorists are irrational religious zealots who do not respond to monetary and personal incentives should remember that a daily dose of just ten dollars is enough to get such folks to become quasi-friends of the United States of America."
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For the recommendations that I discussed to have a sustainable effect, the government of the Congo would need to institute a national healing process that is analogous to the one that occurred under the auspices of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
However, I do not see this ever happening... [6]
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[2] Joseph Kabila has certainly demonstrated that he is a rational leader, albeit a chronically underestimated one.
[3] (See Chapter 15 of Jason Stearns's text which is entitled Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of The Congo and The Great War of Africa). The Mobutuists and Rwandan elites tried to co-opt Bemba into the structures of the political formation that they were establishing.
[4] Old-line mining firms have political clout.
[5] In practice this would be the most difficult to do - because of "geopolitical impediments".
[6] Who in their right mind would elect to institute a process that would publicly reveal his or her misdeeds?
[7] They have a tribalistic conspiracy theory that they like to peddle, which, my gut instinct tells me, was probably formulated by Gaddaffi after Yoweri Museveni scuttled his plans to establish the "United States of Africa". This camp believes that Uganda and Rwanda intend to build a "Hema-Tutsi empire" that would subjugate the whole of Africa.
