While it is indeed correct that this nickname evokes grossly inaccurate images of Zimbabwe feeding the rest of Africa; the sobriquet does highlight the following facts:
- During the captioned time period, Zimbabwe was, in years of normal rainfall, a self-sufficient food producer.
- During the captioned time period, Zimbabwe was one of the few African countries that produced surplus grain. This surplus was usually exported to Zimbabwe's grain deficit neighbors in the SADC region.
- During the captioned time period, yields of maize in Zimbabwe were multiples of the 2-4 tonne per hectare average yield of other SADC countries.
Interestingly, some commentators argue that the underpinnings of Zimbabwe's agricultural feats of yesteryear have their origins in then-prevalent regime of land tenure: During the first two decades of Zimbabwe's post-independence era, 70% of the nation's arable land was owned by commercial farmers who were able to profitably apply avant-garde technology and capital to bolster productivity; i.e. farmers whose operations were amenable to scale economics. [6]
This line of reasoning is somewhat correct, however, it fails to answer the pertinent question of why Zimbabwe was or is conducive to commercial agriculture in the first place. Illustration 1 ― below ― helps to answer this question:
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| Illustration 1 (click on illustration to zoom in) Adapted From: Zeihan, 2015 |
As Illustration 1 ― above ― shows, Zimbabwe is one of the few African countries with a high concentration of easily developed lands (and moderately difficult lands). The lands are located in contiguous belts that cover the country's northern and north-eastern, southern and south-eastern regions.
Otherwise expressed; some segments of Zimbabwean territory have high quality soils, a relatively flat topography, and thus; require relatively little capital to bring them into production; they don't have to be terraformed. Succinctly; geography predisposes Zimbabwe to productive commercial agriculture.
Geography also predisposes Zimbabwe to water scarcity. Illustration 2 ― below ― will be used to shed light on the full extent of Zimbabwe's water woes:
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| Illustration 2 (click on illustration to zoom in) Adapted From: Google Earth Pro, 2015, and; UN Water, 2005 |
Zimbabwe is located in the yellow zone in Illustration 2 ― above. This zone, i.e. South Western Africa, has barely sufficient freshwater resources to fully satisfy irrigated crop demands.
In fact, most of central and eastern South Africa, south eastern and north Eastern Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Lesotho and south western Mozambique has a low freshwater irrigation overdraft. Thus, it is reasonable to assert that the water security of the South Western Africa will be compromised by any attempt to expand its agricultural base. Agriculture-wise, South Western Africa has the most precarious water-security position [1].
Evidently, this implies that geography counterbalanced Zimbabwe's high concentration of quality agricultural lands with insufficient freshwater resources to develop them.
Geography also gave Zimbabwe a high vulnerability to climate change. Illustration 3 ― below ― expounds:
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| Illustration 3 (click on illustration to zoom in) Adapted From: ND, 2015 |
As Illustration 3 ― above ― shows, when Climate Change Vulnerability is adjusted for Change Readiness, Zimbabwe has one of the most precarious positions in Africa.
Illustration 4 ― below ― presents the most probable trajectory of Zimbabwe's internal renewable freshwater resources in a world where all things are equal, i.e. in a ceteris paribus world:
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| Illustration 4 (click on illustration to zoom in) Adapted From: World Bank, 2015, and Grid Arendal, 2001 |
In this post, I will propose a solution that may solve Zimbabwe's water woes. I will open with a discussion on the nuances of Zimbabwe's water crisis and how it influences the nation's food security:
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...Zimbabwe's Food Security
Illustration 5 ― below ― will be used to advance a discussion on the interplay between Zimbabwe's food and water security:
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| Illustration 5 (click on illustration to zoom in) Adapted From: ZimVac, 2013 |
As Illustration 5 ― above ― shows, three (out of ten) Zimbabwean provinces experienced severe crop losses in the 2011/2012 agricultural season [2].
They include Manicaland, Midlands and Masvingo provinces. In aggregate, they lost 387,416 hectares of maize. This translates to a loss of between 774,832 and 1,549,672 tonnes of maize or corn.
Illustration 6 ― below ― helps to explain why:
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| Illustration 6 (click on illustration to zoom in) Adapted From: ZimVac, 2013 |
As Illustration 6 ― above ― shows:
- Delayed Rainfall: In Mashonaland East and Manicaland provinces, the onset of the rainy season ― which normally starts in October and ends in February or March ― was delayed by two months. When the rains finally arrived in November of 2011, they were torrential; a season's-worth of rainfall occurred in three to six weeks; maize fields first wilted and then they were finally inundated and submerged. Owing to water logging, crops in the eastern regions of the country were damaged.
- Prolonged Dry spell: In Matebeleland South, Matebeleland North, Masvingo, Midlands, Mashonaland West and Mashonaland Central provinces there was a prolonged dry spell; maize fields were scorched by the Savannah sun. Owing to this, crops wilted away.
Hence, in the 2011-2012 cropping season, Zimbabwe experienced a peculiar climatic dynamic; floods in its eastern provinces and dry spells in western, southern, northern and central provinces.
Evidently, this dynamic could be negated by simply building drainage canals that transport excess water from the Zimbabwe's eastern provinces to the other provinces. However, the reality is a bit complex; the 2011-2012 climatic dynamic does not occur with the regularity that justifies such a capital outlay.
Otherwise put; the only thing that is regular about Zimbabwe's water cycle is an intensifying water deficit, which, in turn, causes a food deficit.
Thus, it is reasonable to assert that food imports will increasingly dominate Zimbabwe's import ledgers. By extension, one can also assert that owing to rising food imports, Zimbabwe will increasingly become vulnerable to the gyrations of commodity markets.
Hence, it is reasonable to expect social unrest in Zimbabwe whenever food prices spike sharply; the Malthusian dynamic [3]. With the passage of time, the risk of this type of unrest is set to increase sharply. This sums up Zimbabwe's baseline scenario.
...What can be done to ease Zimbabwe's water burdens?
As the shaded part of Illustration 7 ― below ― shows, during the 2011-2012 agricultural season Zimbabwe eased the food deficit ― that was spawned by its water deficit ― by increasing its imports of food:
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| Illustration 7 (click on illustration to zoom in) Adapted From: World Bank, 2016 |
A better way to address Zimbabwe's 683.70 cubic meter per capita water deficit ― and the food crisis that it spawns ― would be for Zimbabwe to import water from its SADC region neighboring countries.
Illustration 8 ― below ― expounds:
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| Illustration 8 (click on illustration to zoom in) Adapted From: World Bank, 2015 |
As Illustration 8 ― above ― shows, Zimbabwe's water-rich SADC neighbors include:
- The DRC.
- Angola.
- Zambia.
- Mozambique.
- Lesotho.
Angola, The DRC and Lesotho are too far; hence, this rules these countries out. Further, the bulk of Zambia's water resources are located in its far off northern regions; which also rules out Zambia.
Hence, the most probable source of water imports is Mozambique. Illustration 9 ― below ― expounds:
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| Illustration 9 (click on illustration to zoom in) Adapted From: Zeihan, 2015 |
As Illustration 9 ― above ― shows, unlike Zimbabwe ― which has a temperate and semi-arid climate ― Mozambique has a predominantly tropical climate.
During its wet season, Mozambique experiences torrential rains. Owing to this, its low lying Tete province is prone to flooding.
To assuage Mozambique of its flooding problem, and to ease Zimbabwe's water deficit; a pipeline could be constructed as is shown in Illustration 10 ― below:
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| Illustration 10 (click on illustration to zoom in) Adapted From: ESRI ArGIS Platform, 2016 |
As Illustration 10 ― above ― shows, the proposed 300 mile long pipeline(s) would link the Tete province, of Mozambique, to the central watershed system of Zimbabwe, in Marondera [4].
Once water is pumped into the central watershed system of Zimbabwe, it would naturally be transported by Zimbabwe's river system to existing reservoirs, dams, and irrigation canals.
The approximate costs of such an undertaking can be summed as follows:
- Set-up Costs: A large diameter water pipeline costs about USD 2 million per mile to build. Hence, the total cost of installing a pipeline from Tete, in Mozambique, to Marondera, in Zimbabwe can be put at USD 600 million. [7]
- Operating Costs: These are dependent on the number of storage tanks that are installed, the number of pumps that are used, the energy source that is used to pump the water and the maintenance and operating model that is employed.
- Water Purchase Costs: These are dependent on the model that Mozambique would use to price its water [5].
To conclude, it is my belief that this proposed project would, in the long run, turn out to be cheaper than importing food stuffs via road or rail, and; that it would stimulate the development of Zimbabwe's agricultural sector.
Otherwise put; it warrants a feasibility study!
[2] This is the agricultural season with the highest quality, most up-to-date independently-generated countrywide data.
[3] One of the factors that caused the Arab Spring: When the Arab Spring occurred, Egyptians spent approximately 38.3% of their annual income on food. To put this into context, around that time Finnish people spent 12.1% of their annual income on food and Singaporeans spent 8.1% of their annual income on food; Egyptians were spending too much on food. As for the other countries that were affected by the Arab Spring, the proportion of annual income that was spent on food was close to the Egyptian figure: Tunisia - 35.8%, Algeria - 43.8%, Morocco - 40.3% and Jordan - 40.8%. When wheat prices ― driven up by the wave of quantitative easing that ensued the Global Financial Crisis ― increased between late 2008 and 2010, the proportion of annual income that Egyptians spent on food rose. Owing to this, people became restive.
[4] The proposed pipeline will run through Renamo's territory, i.e. rebel-group-cum-political-party territory. Thus, security provisions would have to be made to protect the pipeline from rebel activity.
[5] The proposed pipeline will increase the chances of a Mozambique-Zimbabwe confrontation by increasing interdependence. The following quote explains why: "Interdependence leads to war: Madagascar and Brazil are not going to fight a war; they have no issues between them. But France and Germany are interlocked; ...geographically, industrially, commercially and financially. And, the disadvantage of one is the advantage of the other; and, each lives in dread of the other. Not just of its armies, but the fact that interdependence means that; 'if he does this, this will mean that to me', makes each one want to control the other... Wars do not happen between nations that are not interconnected; they happen when there is interdependence." ― George Friedman.
[6] Scale Effects Leveraged by Technology: "1 farmer in mechanized countries can feed 155 people today and this is expected to rise to 200 by 2020 vs. 1:25 in 1960 and 1:2.5 in the early 20th century." ― BofAML
[7] Postscript 2/5/2016: According to a recent news article, this figure is a third of the recently borrowed amount (USD200 million) that Zimbabwe seeks to spend in 2016 on food imports.
