Reframing the De-Risking Africa debate

 "When thoughtful people disagree, you get the opportunity to learn a lot"

– Ray Dalio

I've had the opportunity to re-watch the video that captures the key proceedings of the "De-Risking Africa" event that was hosted by CNBC Africa (at the just ended World Economic Forum). Surprisingly, my thoughts, when I watched the recorded footage of the debate, were different to the thoughts that raced through my mind as I watched the live screening of the debate.

When I watched the debate live, I felt that:

1. It was too short to cover the crucial issues. I felt that it would be prudent for CNBC Africa to host follow-up events to discuss all the facets of this very pertinent topic.
2. It moved, expeditiously, to issues of skewed risk-perception before the fundamentals were exhausted. And, I also felt that everything else was overshadowed once the discussion touched upon the emotive issue of risk-perception.

However, when I watched the video this time around, I felt that all key facets of this topic were reasonably covered. And... that with more time, they would have been exhausted completely.

In both instances, I was of the opinion that the moderator did a great job; the panellists were engaging, and; the discussion was spirited, optimistic (to a fault) and insightful; it definitely elevated my thinking. The event also motivated me to reflect on the topic of "De-risking Africa".

In this post, I will share the end-products of this reflective endeavour.

***

When I reflected on the topic of "De-risking Africa", I aimed to drill deeper than the surface issues; I desired to further explore the hidden dimensions of the issues that the panellists broached. The breadth of the topic made it difficult to tackle it head-on, so I broke it down into manageable chunks as Illustration 1 shows:

Illustration 1 (click on illustration to zoom in)

Illustration 1 shows that I employed the following three questions to scope the coverage of the topic: What is Risk? Which Risks are Prevalent in Africa? Which of these Risks can be managed?

The questions will each be briefly discussed below:


...What is Risk?

Illustration 2, below, is a quantitative definition of risk:

Illustration 2 (click on illustration to zoom in)

As Illustration 2, shows there are two components to risk; the probability of a negative event occurring and the expected loss from the event. Therefore, the term "de-risking" implies reducing or removing risk by doing either of the following:

1. Reducing or eliminating the probability of the occurrence of a negative event, or;
2. Reducing or eliminating the expected loss from a negative event, or;
3. Doing both 1) and 2)

If you take a risk like "losses that stem from social unrest", governments and state agents have control over the probability of the negative event occurring; they can mitigate it by instituting policies that create employment. Whereas, private sector players can mitigate the expected losses from such an event by diversifying their investments across disparate countries and by using financial instruments to hedge their exposures. 

This serves to show that, in any discussion of "de-risking", it is of paramount importance to clearly establish which stakeholder contingent can reduce which element of risk (refer back to Illustration 2 for the elements of risk).

***

...Which Risks are Prevalent in Africa?

To answer this question, I scanned through the archives of the World Economic Forum's publications. And, I found an article which is titled Africa Faces Numerous Risks. Illustration 3 expositions the risks that, according to the article, are prevalent in Africa:

Illustration 3 (click on illustration to zoom in)

According to Illustration 3, the risks that are prevalent in Africa are: Geopolitical Instability, Climate Change. Food and Water Security Issues, and Economic Shocks.

All of these risks are interrelated in one way or another as Illustration 4 shows:

Illustration 4 (click on illustration to zoom in)

Illustration 4 expositions seven chains of causation, including:

• Climate change → Economic Shocks (e.g. two to three years ago, climate change-induced drought affected Kenya’s horticultural industry and curtailed the nation's ability to generate sufficient hydrological electricity).
• Climate Change → Economic Shocks → Geopolitical Instability (this chain tends to manifest itself in agrarian economies).
• Climate Change → Food and Water Security Issues → Economic Shocks.
• Climate Change → Food and Water Security Issues  → Economic Shocks → Geopolitical Instability.
• Geopolitical Instability → Economic Shocks (e.g. Kenya and Zimbabwe’s tourism industries after the countries' violent elections in 2009).
• Geopolitical Instability → Food and Water Security Issues (e.g. Darfur and Somalia during conflict times).
• Economic Shocks → Geopolitical Instability (e.g. Falling coffee prices were cited as a cause of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda).

From these chains of causation, the following is evident:

1. Climate change is the root cause of most Economic Shocks and Food and Water Security Issues in Africa. As emissions negotiations demonstrate time and time again, it would be very difficult to minimize the probability of the occurrence of catastrophic climate change by reducing emissions. Hence, to mitigate the climate change risk, African stakeholders should focus their attention on the "reducing the expected loss from the events" lever in Illustration 2.
2. That similar chains of causation (e.g. Climate change → Economic Shocks, and, Climate Change → Economic Shocks → Geopolitical Instability) spawn different end-risks. Put more clearly: Geopolitical Instability arises (from a set of similar factors) in some instances and not others. This begs the question of why. The easy answer to this question is: Coordination Public Goods (i.e. Free Speech, Free Press and Freedom of Assembly, Free and Fair Elections e.t.c.) are responsible for this difference; they mitigate the risk of geopolitical instability. However, it is important for this link to be demonstrated empirically in new studies, and, it is also important to explore the other factors that play a role in mitigating geopolitical instability.

Africa has come a long way, and for the 5-6% growth rate to be sustained, it is important for stakeholders to have more solution-focused "De-risking Africa"-type debates.

By solution focused debates I mean debates that discuss how to: 1) eliminate the probability of key negative events, and; 2) mitigate the losses that would stem from the-said events. Further, it is also important to give Climate Change the lion's share of the time in such discussions (refer back to Illustration 4), because it is the root cause of most risks in Africa.

The Congo: Rwanda's Ancient Boarders, the DRC's 'Secret History' and Creating Lasting Peace

"Idealists who are not well-grounded in reality create problems, not progress."

– Ray Dalio

There are numerous competing narratives on the origins of the turmoil in the Congo. None of them is entirely precise or factually bankrupt per se; they all contain elements of truth that deserve equal appreciation [1]. Otherwise put; they are part of a coherent whole that has to be fully comprehended before anyone formulates solutions to the Congo issue.

Interestingly enough, all narratives on the origins of the crisis in the Congo stem from three main perspectives or lenses, as Illustration 1 below shows:

Illustration 1 (click on illustration to zoom in)

The lenses can be briefly described as follows:

• The International Human Rights Organization Lens: The main architects of this lens are The Congolese Diaspora, the Francophone Rwandan diaspora and non-profit organizations that have the following mandates; Promotion of Human Rights, Disaster Relief, Poverty Reduction and Human Development. In their work in the Congo, NGOs encounter horrendous atrocities that are committed by state and non-state agents and players. Some of these organizations research, document and bring the-said atrocities to the attention of the world (this is done with the explicit aim of jolting the international community into solution mode). Currently, the international human rights organization lens is focused on the M23 mutiny, particularly its link to the government of Rwanda.
• The pro-Rwanda Lobby Lens: The main architects of this lens are The Government of Rwanda, Aid Organizations that work in Rwanda, Allies and Associates of the Rwandan elites, Diplomats, the Rwandan Tutsi diaspora and some Development Economists. They are impressed by: the post-genocide progress of the Rwandan economy; her progress in the human development arena, and; the efficacy of the country's aid utilization. They are staunch supporters of the regime that currently administers Rwanda, and, they are currently focused on insulating the Rwandan regime from the diplomatic backlash that was triggered by the revelations of the Group of Experts on the Congo. It would be naive to make broad generalizations about what the interests of the architects of this lens are. However, it is safe to assert that a certain subset of this group seeks to champion the rights of Kinyarwanda-speaking people in the Great Lakes Region of Africa.
• The Multitudinous Rebel Group Lens: The main architects of this lens are rebel groups that roam(ed) the rainforests of the Congo like the AFDL, ALEC, ALiR, AMP, Remnants of the CNDP, FARDC, FDC, FDLR, FCLC, FRF, LRA, MRPC, NDC, ADCLS, FRPI, FDLR, M23, Nyatura, Sheka, Mayi-Mayi Yakatumba, Raia Mutomboki and UPCP. Some are "community self-help" groups that have legitimate grievances that they would like the Congolese government to address; others are remnants of foreign military outfits that seek to use the Congo as a launch-hub for attacks on other nations; while others could be characterised as scavengers. Alliances are always being forged and broken, sometimes violently, by members of these rebel groups. Thus, it is difficult to make broad generations about their points of view. Further, most of these rebel groups are inept at public relations, and, they are generally marginalized by the research community and the international media because of (logistical constraints and) the fear of legitimizing the rebel groups' respective positions.

By and large, the architects of each lens zealously discount the assertions that are made by the architects of other lenses; regardless of whether there is a modicum of truth in them or not. Otherwise put, their battles to define the popular narrative of the Congo Issue obfuscate its elements. And, this inhibits the formulation of solutions that would create lasting peace and prosperity for the Congolese people.

In this post, I will attempt to amalgamate the competing lenses to produce a holistic snapshot of the Congo issue.

I will start by discussing Rwanda's ancient boarders and the history of the Banyamulenge in the Congo. Secondly, I will discuss the evolution of hostilities towards the Kinyarwanda-speaking people, and, how they were shaped by politicians and the activities of Rwanda-sponsored forces in the Congo. Lastly, I will demonstrate how these hostilities will make it difficult for the Kabila government to address the grievances of the Banyamulenge / Banyarwanda / Kinyarwanda-speaking people.

***

"To remain ignorant of things that happened before you were born is to remain a child."

 – Cicero

"History is the witness that testifies to the passing of time; it illumines reality, vitalizes memory, provides guidance in daily life and brings us tidings of antiquity"

 – Cicero

 
Between 1880 and 1895, a Rwandan Chief, or Mwami, called Rabugiri established a unified state with a centralised military structure. As Illustration 2, below, shows, the Rwandan nation that Rabugiri founded overspills into the modern-day territory of Tanzania and the DRC:

Illustration 2 Adapted from: Exploring Africa

Illustration 2 clearly shows that the Old Rwandan kingdom spilled over into the outermost fringes of what is now known as North and South Kivu. In South Kivu, the Old Rwandan kingdom intersected with the Luba kingdom. Therefore, it is reasonable to assert that the sliver of territory that is annotated "This Land" in Illustration 2 is the segment of the modern-day Congo that can (uncontestably) be regarded as part of the Old Rwandan kingdom.

 

In a protest letter that was penned by a Group of Scholars (on Eastern Congo) to the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon, they stated that "the origins of the problem" (i.e. Marginalization of Kinyarwanda-speaking people in the DRC) lay in the "Berlin Conference [where some] Rwandan territories became Congolese". They also recommended for the UN Secretary General to investigate the "pillage" of the Congo by "foreign firms". Interestingly, this letter was quoted and referenced heavily in the Rwandan media (which is state controlled). 

Hence, this indicates that the Rwandan elites endorse its contents; they are unhappy about the marginalization of Kinyarwanda-speaking people in the Congo, and, they are unhappy about the "pillage of the Congo by foreign firms". 

In the latter parts of this post, I will indicate how these two points and the historical boundaries of Rwanda can be used to disincentivize the Rwandan government from sponsoring rebel groups.

***

...How did the Kinyarwanda-speaking people come to settle in the Congo?

Illustration 3, below, answers the question that is in the heading of this section:

Illustration 3 (download for a better view)

As Illustration 3 shows, Banyarwanda migration to the DRC was largely push migration; it was generally forced. It occurred during the following time-periods:

• 1880 to 1895: A small contingent of Banyarwanda (both Tutsi and Hutu) fled to South Kivu in the Congo, after Mwami Rabugiri - the unifier chief that I mentioned in the opening paragraphs, instituted onerous taxes. In the late 1920s, the Tutsi from this contingent were allowed, by the Congo colonial authorities, to occupy a high plateau farther south.
• 1924 to 1929: Over 7,000 Banyarwanda, i.e. Tutsi and Hutu, arrived in South Kivu in the Congo in search of work.
• 1959 to 1960: An Influx of Tutsi refugees arrived in South Kivu in the Congo. It had fled the "Social Revolution" in Rwanda that was led by Grégoire Kayibanda.
• 1971 to 1973: Anti-Hutu massacres occurred in Burundi and revenge anti-Tutsi persecutions occurred in Rwanda. Owing to this, a contingent of Rwandan Tutsi refugees joined the pastoral Tutsi in South Kivu.

In the 1970s, Mobutu Sese Seko's Citizenship Act "compelled" the Banyarwanda to convert their collective name to Banyamulenge. Around this time, the Banyarwanda in South Kivu started to increasingly refer to themselves as the Banya-Tulambo and the Banya-Minembwe, i.e. they named themselves after their "home regions", Tulambo and Minembwe. [5]

In the latter parts of this post, I will return to this point.

***

...Major Incidents of Persecution

The major incidents of Tutsi persecution that transpired in the Congo can be abbreviated as follows:

• 1970s to 1980s: The Congo Citizenship Act of 1971, which was instituted by the Mobutu government, "compelled" the Tutsi to convert their collective identity from Banyarwanda to Banyamulenge; which loosely translates to "People of Mulenge". Naturally, this created tensions between the Tutsi and the Bafuliro people, who were the original inhabitants of Mulenge. 
• I981: The Nande and Hunde people from North Kivu, i.e. a region in which Tutsi migrants had settled, launched a campaign to strip-away the citizenship of Tutsi that descended from post-1885 migrants from Rwanda.
• 1985: The "Indigenous" Kivutian majority, i.e. the Nande and Hunde elites, instituted reforms that would restrict Banyarwanda from holding political office.
• 1993: Bloody conflicts occurred between the Tutsi, Hutu and indigenous populations of the Kivu region. To contain the violence, the Mobutu government sent poorly equipped and corrupt troops. The troops appeared to support the Banyarwanda -- which further aggravated the tensions between them and the other inhabitants of the Kivus.
• 1993 to 1994: Tensions between the Hutu genocidiares, who had fled into the DRC, and the Tutsi inhabitants of the Kivus started rising.
• 1994 to 1996: In 1995, Anzuluni Mbembe, the co-speaker of the Parliament of Congo, signed a resolution which stated that all "recent" Banyamulenge refugees would be expelled from the Congo. In addition to this, he compiled a list of "other" Banyamulenge who would be expelled from the country. In 1996, all Banyamulenge who did not obey the-said decree had their property expropriated, and, they were shepherded into refugee camps. In response to this injustice, Banyamulenge militia coalesced to fight the Mobutu government, and, most of them joined the Rwanda-backed ADFL force which was headed by Laurent Kabila.
• 1998: A war broke-out when Laurent Kabila, who was the President of the Congo at that time, purged Tutsi from the government and ordered Rwandan troops and Banyamulenge to leave the Congo.
• 2000: Banyamulenge civilians were terrorized by the Mai-Mai, Burundian Forces for the Defense of Democracy and the Rwandan Hutu Armée de Libération du Rwanda (ALiR).
  

...Sources of Hostility

Immigration is never frictionless. By and large, whenever there is turmoil in host communities, the majority of the blame tends to be apportioned to immigrants. Generally, the higher the degree of linguistic, cultural, physical, and economic differences between the immigrants and their host communities; the greater the blame.

Hence, it is reasonable to assert that tensions between the Banyarwanda and the indigenous groups were ever-present, and, that they tended to intensify in times of communal turmoil. 

In the absence of communal integration initiatives that would foster mutual respect and understanding, these tensions only festered and spawned incidents of violence between 'in-groups' and 'out-groups'.

The earliest record of hostilities between the Banyarwanda and indeginous populations in the Kivus can be found in the 1964 to 1965 period. In 1964, Banyamulenge in the DRC joined the Simba Rebellion that sought to depose Mobutu Sese Seko. 

However, they switched sides and joined pro-Mobutu Sese Seko forces when the Simba rebels stole their cattle. The neighbouring Bembe group, who were on the pro-rebel side, suffered heavy losses because of this loss of Banyarwanda support. This created inter-group tensions. 

As I stated elsewhere, between the 1970s and the 1980s, the Banyarwanda converted their collective identity to Banyamulenge, which loosely translates to "People of Mulenge". Naturally, this escallated the tensions between the Banyarwanda and the Bafuliro people (who were the original inhabitants of Mulenge).

It is important to note that the anti-Banyarwanda sentiment in the DRC was largely confined to the eastern regions of the country. And, it only cropped-up in other parts of the country when the Congolese learnt, from Burundian Hutu immigrants, of the callous atrocities that were committed by the Tutsi-elites that controlled Burundi between 1971 and 1973.

It is also important to note that the Mobutu government used a divide and conquer strategy that magnified and exploited this anti-Banyarwanda sentiment. However, it is important to also stress that most Congolese citizens, outside the Kivus, had never encountered Banyarwanda, and thus, they did not harbour any hostilities towards them. 

Otherwise put: it is in recent times that these tensions grew.

The tensions that occurred in recent times can be abbreviated as follows:

• 1996 to 1998: Banyamulenge militia were fomed to fight the Mobutu government, and, a large contingent of the Banyamulenge joined the Rwanda-backed ADFL force which was headed by Laurent Kabila. The ADFL conducted “ Rwandan genocide revenge” killings in South Kivu; Hutu refugees (and militia) and many indigenous Congolese civilians were massacred. This created a strong anti-Tutsi sentiment on the path that the ADFL blazed (on its way to Kinshasa). When Laurent Kabila came into power, he used his force of Banyarwanda child soldiers, referred to as kadogos, from the Kivus to police Kinshasa. They tended to bludgeon people for 'offenses' like wearing short skirts, and, they largely infringed upon the civil liberties of the Congolese people. This magnified the anti-Banyarwanda sentiment in the DRC to levels that were heretofore unseen. Further, around that time, there was also a strong presence of Rwandan forces in the DRC. Congolese citizens generally did not appreciate their presence, and this culminated in an anti-Rwanda / anti-Tutsi parade that was led by Tshala Muana. Jason Stearns's narrative of the parade captures the intense toxicity of the anti-Tutsi sentiment that saturated Kinshasa, and I quote: "Tshala Mwana, a famous singer and allegedly the president’s mistress, led the parade dressed in white, tugging two goats on a leash with signs identifying them as Deo Bugera and Bizima Karaha, the two most famous Tutsi in Kabila’s government who had defected to join the rebellion. Some of the marchers brandished signs [that read]: 'We will make Rwanda the twelfth province of the Congo,' and 'No to Tutsi expansion in the DRC and Africa.'  As the cheering crowd looked on, the famous, brawny wrestler Edingwe—he could often be seen jogging and singing with his followers along the Kinshasa streets at dawn—stepped up and slit the animals’ throats".
• 1998 to 2003: The Rwandan-backed RCD force (that invaded the Congo after the Rwandans were expelled by Laurent Kabila) was met with the resistance of Kabila-backed "ethnic self-defence groups" (that were fighting against "foreign aggression"). The RCD's response to the resistance was to massacre the civilian populations that spawned these groups. Naturally, these massacres elevated the anti-Rwanda / anti-Tutsi sentiment in the DRC to stratospheric levels.
• 1999-2000: In 1999, the allegiance between Rwanda and Uganda became strained. They fought close to three battles on the streets of the diamond-rich city of Kisangani. In these battles, thousands of innocent Congolese civilians lost their lives. Between 1997 and 1999, Uganda's official exports of diamonds grew by a factor of ten, from USD198,000 to USD1.8 million. Further, between 1998 and 2000, Rwanda’s official exports of diamonds also grew from USD6,000 to USD1.7 million. Interestingly enough, Uganda and Rwanda have no known diamond reserves of their own [2]. Naturally, most Congolese citizens have explanations for where Uganda and Rwanda's diamond wealth came from. The common thread that runs across the explanations is: Kisangani.

Hence, it is reasonable to assert that Rwanda's expeditions in the Congo have made a disproportionately large contribution to the anti-Tutsi sentiment in the Congo. 

 ...Kabila's Constraint

In the run-up to the 2006 Congolese presidential election, Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo ran under the slogan: "One hundred percent Congolese". He portrayed Joseph Kabila as a "stooge" of the Rwandan government. Further, Bemba's surrogates used imagery like Illustration 4, a picture of Joseph Kabila and Paul Kagame "on the training grounds" before the first Congo war, to give his message credibility and resonance:

Illustration 4 (click on illustration to zoom in)

In 2010, a tripartite agreement between the DRC, UNHCR and Rwanda, was concluded. Under the terms of the agreement, the parties to the agreement would oversee the repatriation of 55,000 Banyamulenge refugees (who were living in refugee camps in Rwanda).

When the first contingents of repatriated refugees arrived in the Congo, Kabila's detractors resumed whispering the "stooge" rhetoric. This rhetoric resonated among Congolese citizens who feared that their government was smuggling-in Rwandans [3] [5]. Understandably, these fears and the "stooge" rhetoric inevitably weakened Kabila's resolve to address the grievances of the Banyamulenge.

As everyone now appreciates, Mobutu Sese Seko was a tribalist who only cared about the welfare of his Ngbandi tribe. Otherwise put, it is reasonable to assert that 250 (out of the close to 251 tribes in the Congo) have got longstanding grievances that they would like the Kabila government to address.

Thus, it should come as no surprise that when the Kabila government tried to address the grievances of the Banyamulenge, he was accused (by some tribes) of favouritism. Understandably, this, again, weakened Kabila's resolve to address the grievances of the Banyamulenge.

In short, Kabila is damned if he does and damned if he doesn't.

To incentivize him to address the grievances of the Banyamulenge, it is of critical importance to: 1) Acknowledge this fact, and; 2) Formulate a peace plan that would minimize the fallout of addressing the grievances of the Banyamulenge.

***

...Creating Lasting Peace

To create lasting peace, the Kabila government would need to do the following:

1. Acknowledge that the boarders of the Old Rwandan kingdom spilled into the Congo, as Illustration 2 shows, and, give the Rwandan government and its partners, the exclusive rights to exploit the minerals in that spill-over region, especially the territory that is labelled "This Land" in Illustration 2 under an equitable perpetual joint venture agreement (with the local communities). [This measure would give the Rwandan government a strong incentive to foster the stability of the Congo]. Each member of the local communities should have a stake in the mining ventures that enables him / her to earn a monthly cash stream which is multiples of the Congolese per capita income and minimum wage. This, would, in effect: help to address the grievances of the other tribes in the Congo; foster the development of trust between the Congolese and Rwandans, and; absolve the Kabila government of favouritism allegations when it moves to repatriate Banyamulenge. The peace agreement should have a phrase that says something to the effect of: "The Rwandan equity stake portion of the ventures would be expropriated if there is credible evidence that the Rwandan government is supporting mutineers, rebels or foreign invading forces that seek to destabilize the Congo".
2. Stipulate, in the peace agreement, that the reparations that would be made to the Banyamulenge would occur in the form of direct cash transfers to them. And, that these transfers would be made by Rwandan mining ventures that would be operating in the Congo. These expenditures could be deducted from the tax bills of the-said Rwandan mining firms. (I won't disclose my reasons for suggesting this).
3. Address the grassroots grievances of the Banyamulenge and their neighbouring communities, particularly the communities that they had altercations with e.g. the Bafuliro and the Bembe tribes.
4. Repatriate the refugees after steps 1 to 3 have been completed.

***

The human cost of the internecine conflict in the Congo has been too great; 5 million people have lost their lives, others remain displaced and young women continue to be violated in the most savage ways. Rwanda is not entirely responsible for all of these atrocities; there are countless rebel groups that operate in the Congo.

However, a growing body of evidence shows that the Rwandan elites played, and continue to play, a pivotal role in propagating the major conflicts that plunge the Congo into a deeper state of anarchy. [4]

In this post, I have demonstrated that these conflicts have contributed to the meteoric rise of the anti-Tutsi sentiment in the DRC.

Clearly, it is not in Rwanda's interests to continue to support armed conflict in the Congo.

***

[1] There is an element of truth in all the narratives - every single one of them!
[2] Source: Report of the United Nations Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2001/ 357, United Nations, April 12, 2001, 21.
[3] Source: Report from the Rift Valley Institute's Usalama Project titled From CNDP to M23: The Evolution of an armed Movement in Eastern Congo
[4] Criticism of the "foreign ventures" of Rwandan elites does not imply hostility towards Rwandan civilians.
[5] Between 1970 and 2012, the Congo's population grew at a mean rate of 3.065% per year. Therefore the total Banyamulenge population (i.e. Banyamulenge currently living in the DRC and Banyamulenge in the refugee camps in neighbouring countries) should approximately be equal to the total population of Banyamulenge in the Congo in 1970 with a mean growth rate of 3.065% per year.

DRC: Using Bueno de Mesquita's Model to Sketch-Out a Peace Roadmap

"It's eastern Congo. If it were not the M23 killing people it would be some other armed groups"

—Susan Rice, US Ambassador to the UN (source)

Illustration 1, below, unequivocally demonstrates that most of the Congo's known tin, copper, gold, coltan, coal and uranium deposits are scattered along the nation's eastern border:

Illustration 1 (click on illustration to zoom in)

Otherwise put, Illustration 1 adds a bit more texture to the point that Susan Rice was trying to put across in the quote that opened this post. Rice's point can be crudely put as follows:

Congo will forever be inundated by a tidal wave of savage marauders who desire to pillage her natural resource wealth. 

Therefore, it is reasonable to assert that peace initiatives that fail to factor-in this grim reality are doomed to fail (abysmally).

  

Illustration 2, below, chronicles the mineral-wealth-driven conflicts that plagued the Congo's history:

Illustration 2 (download for a better view)

This all begs the following questions:

• Will the Congo ever be a stable country?
• How can the Congo use its mineral wealth to lift its people out of poverty?

In this post, I will use game theory to formulate unconventional answers to the above-mentioned questions. The analytical approach that I will use was propounded by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. He discussed it in Chapter 4 of his riveting text which is titled The Predictioneer's Game: Using the Logic of Brazen Self-Interest to See and Shape the Future. 

Interestingly enough, the approach consists of just four broad steps. They can be summed as follows, and I quote:

1. "Identification of every individual or group with a meaningful interest in trying to influence the outcome".
2. "Estimation, as accurately as possible and with the available information, of what policy each of the players identified in point 1 is advocating when they talk in private to each other—that is, what do they say they want".
3. "Approximation of how big an issue this is for each of the players—that is, how salient is it to them. Are they so concerned that they would drop whatever they’re doing to address this problem when it comes up, or are they likely to want to postpone discussions while they deal with more pressing matters?"
4. Answering this question: "Relative to all of the other players, how influential can each player be in persuading others to change their position on the issue?"

***

...Who has a Meaningful Interest in the Congo? What do they say they Want?


Table 1 below expositions the entities that have meaningful interest in the DRC, and, it briefly discusses what they say they want:

Table 1 (click on table to zoom in)

Table 2 below is a continuation of Table 1, it also expositions the entities that are interested in the DRC and it briefly discusses what they say they want:

Table 2 (click on table to zoom in)

From Tables 1 and 2, it is apparent that the entities that have "meaningful interest" in the DRC's stability are: Rwanda; Mobutuists; Angola; the SADC; Hutu Militia; Uganda; Banyamulenge; Aid Organizations and The International Community; The Kabila Government; Kabila-era Entrepreneurs, and; Multitudinous Rebel Groups.

***

...What are the Positions of the Entities in Tables 1 and 2?

Illustration 3, below, depicts the Congo Stability Issue continuum; starting from the most radical positions (held by the entities in Tables 1 and 2), and gradually moving to the more conservative positions:

Illustration 3 (download for a better view)

Therefore, the positions of the entities that were discussed in Tables 1 and 2 can be abbreviated as follows:

• A Stable Mobutuist Government: The Hutu Militia and Mobutuists.
• A Stable Rwandan / Uganda Surrogate Government: Rwanda and Uganda.
• A Stable Democratically Elected Government: Aid Organizations and the International Community.
• A Coalition Government with Substantial Concessions: Multitudinous Rebel Groups.
• A Coalition Government with Moderate Concessions: SADC and Angola.
• A Coalition Government with Limited Concessions: The Kabila Government.
• A Kabila Dictatorship: Kabila-era entrepreneurs.

***

...How Powerful are the Stakeholders? How focused are they on the Congo Issue?

Table 3 is a relative ranking of the power, and, salience (i.e. a measure of how intensely they are focused on the Congo Issue) of the entities that were discussed in Tables 1 and 2:

Table 3 (click on table to zoom in)

If you ignore the potential of a veto and plug the Power and Salience data that was presented in Table 3, and, the Position data that was presented in Illustration 3, into the de Mesquita prediction model [1]; it tells you that the next Congolese government would be a hybrid of a government in which Joseph Kabila makes substantial concessions to the multitudinous Congolese rebel groups, and, a democratically elected government. Otherwise put, this implies that Joseph Kabila would:

• Be stepping down as president of the DRC in the very near future. And, he would probably get a popular person, like Moïse Katumbi Chapwe, to stand in as his party's representative in the next presidential election. Before he does this, he would first purge all members of his party who rigidly hold on to the notion that he should stay in power and make limited concessions to the rebel groups (Kabila will do this to guarantee his party a victory in the next presidential election, which would give it legitimacy). However, this does not imply that he would completely vanish from the political scene; he could probably stay on as the chairman of his party, or, as the minister of defence.
• Give the Banyamulenge their land, expropriated property, and award them the full rights and privileges of Congolese citizens. He will do this to neutralize their hostilities.

Random Comment: Truth be told, this output sounds too bizarre to be plausible! It certainly is not what I was expecting.

FYI: Without the veto input, the model has an accuracy rate of around 70%, so take this output seriously, but do retain a modicum of scepticism. The model also assumes that all the entities in question, especially Joseph Kabila, are rational. [2]

If this prediction obtains, the power that buttressed five different positions would be consolidated as is shown in Illustration 4 below:

Illustration 4 (click on illustration to zoom in)

This would create a coalition with a power level of 57% (or 68% if the reparations succeed in winning the loyalty and support of the Banyamulenge) - which would enable the Congolese government to engineer outcomes and create lasting peace. 

  

***

...The Engineered Roadmap to Peace

 "The fact is that a man who wants to act virtuously in every way necessarily comes to grief among so many who are not virtuous."

—Niccolo Machiavelli

Illustration 5, below, expositions the actions that the Congolese government could take to create a more secure environment for ordinary Congolese citizens (i.e. after the realignment of power has taken place):

Illustration 5 (download for a better view)

The actions in Illustration 5 can be expounded as follows:

Step 1: Bring the Mobutuists on Board

The Mobutuists and the leaders of the Hutu Militia have the following links: 1) they collaborated when Mobutu and Habyarimana were still in power, and; 2) they would both benefit from a stable Mobutuist government coming into power. Briefly stated: they have a history of collaborating and they currently have common interests. Therefore, there is the risk that the more extreme members of the Mobutuist camp would ally themselves with the Hutu Militia, and collaborate to destabilize Rwanda and The Congo.

To neutralize this threat, Kabila could bring them on board. The benefits of bringing the Mobutuists on board can be summed as follows:

• They are entrepreneurial, have "capital" and understand the Congolese business environment. Otherwise put, they are the ideal investors for the DRC.
• Some of the generals in the Mobutuist camp were trained in Belgium and France and their skills could bolster the strategic ranks of the Congolese army.
• Bringing them on board would increase the power of the Kabila coalition from 57%, in Illustration 4, to at least 67%, which would bolster its ability to shape outcomes.

Would the Mobutuists be willing to join Kabila? My answer to this question would be: yes. According to Jason Stearns's narrative of the formation of the MLC by Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo; when Bemba established the MLC, Mobutuist generals (and politicians) regularly met with members of the Rwandan elite in Kigali to discuss possible 'avenues of collaboration' [3]. By and large, Mobutuist generals dislike the current Rwandan elites very much [7], and these meetings signal desperation for power. Succinctly put: they would be amenable to collaborating with Kabila - it would give them relevance!

Step 2: Give Eastern Mineral Concessions to American, Belgian, French and British Firms

Illustration 1 unequivocally demonstrates that the majority of the DRC's mineral resources lie along its eastern frontier. To bolster the security of the eastern frontier, the Kabila government could give eastern mineral concessions to old-line American, Belgian, French and British mining houses [4]. (Obviously, this has to be done under an equitable joint venture arrangement with the Congolese government).

Naturally, these firms would make their own private security arrangements, i.e. they would hire the best "soldiers of fortune", to protect their investments. Further, the British, French, Belgian and American governments would be amenable to contributing troops to protect the investments of their citizens. Clearly, this would, in effect, create an eastern security buffer zone that would: 1) Prevent rebels from tapping the Congo's mineral wealth and using it to fund conflicts, and; 2) Curtail the encroachment of any invading forces (all invading forces in the Congo launch their attacks from the east).

Step 3: Build a Formidable Military Apparatus

Ever the consummate strategist, Mobutu Sese Seko deliberately kept the Zairian military weak; he did this to mitigate the threat of a coup. This militaristic weakness is a legacy that the Kabila government needs to rid itself of, i.e. if it wants to foster greater stability.

To bolster the military of the Congo, the Kabila government would need to:

• Build a well-trained and well-equipped coast guard and "navy" that would patrol Lake Kivu and nip any amphibious threats in the bud.
• Build autonomous aerial surveillance and attack capabilities that would enable it to monitor and eradicate rebel activity in the Kivu area and the Rwenzori Mountain range.
• Acquire nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. To expound, there was a reason why Saddam Hussein told the world that he had weapons of mass destruction when he didn't: he did it to deter internal and external forces from seizing power violently. [5] Thus, it is reasonable to assert that nuclear and biological weapons would raise the costs of invading the Congo, and, adversely alter the cost-benefit calculus of invasion.

Step 4: Enter into Tourism Joint ventures with Uganda, South Sudan and Rwanda

In his text which is entitled The Predictioneer's Game, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita demonstrates that tourism is a rewarding economic activity that is highly sensitive to incidents of violence. 

To mitigate the risk of conflict with neighbouring countries, the Congolese government could start a transnational gorilla (specifically bonobos) conservancy, on its eastern frontier, in partnership with the Rwandan, South Sudanese and Ugandan Governments.

In such a scenario, if a conflict occured on its eastern frontier, the revenue loss for the Rwandan, Ugandan, and South Sudanese governments would be great. In the specific cases of the Rwandan and Ugandan governments, i.e. governments that are heavily subsidized by economically troubled donors (to the tune of 40% to 50% of their respective budgets), this revenue loss would trigger severe austerity pains that would have consequences that are too disconcerting to fathom.

Clearly, the abovementioned tourism joint venture would incent Rwanda and Uganda to foster the stability of the Congo, and, it would also disincentivize them from sponsoring rebel forces that would distabilize the Congo.

***

As for the young men who belong to the alphabet soup of rebel groups that roam the rainforests; they could be demobilized, rehabilitated, retrained and employed as "neighbourhood protection police" who would work alongside traditional chiefs, or the Mwamis, to enforce the rule of law in their communities.

For this approach to yield tangible results, the Congolese government would have to pay these young men multiples of the Congolese minimum wage. This approach could have the impact that it had in Iraq. In The Predictioneer's Game, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita reflected, and I quote:

"The United States operates the Concerned Local Citizens program in Iraq. Following the alphabet-soup tradition so beloved by the Pentagon, the Iraqis participating in this program are known as CLCs. CLCs help guard neighborhoods against insurgents. They are paid ten dollars a day for their service. It doesn’t seem as if there is anything crass or overly materialistic about that. But then we should pause to ask, who are these CLCs and what, exactly, are we buying for ten dollars a day?

These concerned Iraqis are not your ordinary neighborhood watch group. They are not the folks next door who give school kids a safe place to go when their parents are at work. They are not the friends who have your house key, water your plants, take in your mail, and feed your cat while you’re on vacation. No, they’re former anti-American insurgents, tens of thousands of them. Some of them, in fact, used to belong to al-Qaeda. It would seem that they were among the most fanatic of fanatics, the worst of the worst. And yet for a measly ten bucks a day these supposedly unshakable al-Qaeda terrorists now act like allies of the United States, serving as our very own paramilitaries, helping to keep violence down in mostly Sunni neighborhoods, defending the peace that they used to shatter for a living. How can this be? How can terrorists be so easily converted into our friends and protectors?

As it happens, being an ex-insurgent employed as a CLC is a very good job by Iraqi standards. At ten dollars a day, CLCs can earn a few thousand dollars a year from the United States, plus, of course, whatever extra they make on the side. The average Iraqi, despite that country’s huge oil wealth, earns only about six dollars a day, almost half what a CLC gets! Those who think that terrorists are irrational religious zealots who do not respond to monetary and personal incentives should remember that a daily dose of just ten dollars is enough to get such folks to become quasi-friends of the United States of America."

 ***

For the recommendations that I discussed to have a sustainable effect, the government of the Congo would need to institute a national healing process that is analogous to the one that occurred under the auspices of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 

However, I do not see this ever happening... [6]

***

[1] I made my own simple version of the model using the guidelines that he set out in Chapter 4 of The Predictioneer's Game.
[2] Joseph Kabila has certainly demonstrated that he is a rational leader, albeit a chronically underestimated one.
[3] (See Chapter 15 of Jason Stearns's text which is entitled Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of The Congo and The Great War of Africa). The Mobutuists and Rwandan elites tried to co-opt Bemba into the structures of the political formation that they were establishing.
[4] Old-line mining firms have political clout.
[5] In practice this would be the most difficult to do - because of "geopolitical impediments".
[6] Who in their right mind would elect to institute a process that would publicly reveal his or her misdeeds?
[7] They have a tribalistic conspiracy theory that they like to peddle, which, my gut instinct tells me, was probably formulated by Gaddaffi after Yoweri Museveni scuttled his plans to establish the "United States of Africa". This camp believes that Uganda and Rwanda intend to build a "Hema-Tutsi empire" that would subjugate the whole of Africa.