Sunday, January 20, 2013

The Congo: Rwanda's Ancient Boarders, the DRC's 'Secret History' and Creating Lasting Peace

"Idealists who are not well-grounded in reality create problems, not progress."
– Ray Dalio

There are numerous competing narratives on the origins of the turmoil in the Congo. None of them is entirely precise or factually bankrupt per se; they all contain elements of truth that deserve equal appreciation [1]. Otherwise put; they are part of a coherent whole that has to be fully comprehended before anyone formulates solutions to the Congo issue.

Interestingly enough, all narratives on the origins of the crisis in the Congo stem from three main perspectives or lenses, as Illustration 1 below shows:


Illustration 1 (click on illustration to zoom in)


The lenses can be briefly described as follows:
  • The International Human Rights Organization Lens: The main architects of this lens are The Congolese Diaspora, the Francophone Rwandan diaspora and non-profit organizations that have the following mandates; Promotion of Human Rights, Disaster Relief, Poverty Reduction and Human Development. In their work in the Congo, NGOs encounter horrendous atrocities that are committed by state and non-state agents and players. Some of these organizations research, document and bring the-said atrocities to the attention of the world (this is done with the explicit aim of jolting the international community into solution mode). Currently, the international human rights organization lens is focused on the M23 mutiny, particularly its link to the government of Rwanda.
  • The pro-Rwanda Lobby Lens: The main architects of this lens are The Government of Rwanda, Aid Organizations that work in Rwanda, Allies and Associates of the Rwandan elites, Diplomats, the Rwandan Tutsi diaspora and some Development Economists. They are impressed by: the post-genocide progress of the Rwandan economy; her progress in the human development arena, and; the efficacy of the country's aid utilization. They are staunch supporters of the regime that currently administers Rwanda, and, they are currently focused on insulating the Rwandan regime from the diplomatic backlash that was triggered by the revelations of the Group of Experts on the Congo. It would be naive to make broad generalizations about what the interests of the architects of this lens are. However, it is safe to assert that a certain subset of this group seeks to champion the rights of Kinyarwanda-speaking people in the Great Lakes Region of Africa.
  • The Multitudinous Rebel Group Lens: The main architects of this lens are rebel groups that roam(ed) the rainforests of the Congo like the AFDL, ALEC, ALiR, AMP, Remnants of the CNDP, FARDC, FDC, FDLR, FCLC, FRF, LRA, MRPC, NDC, ADCLS, FRPI, FDLR, M23, Nyatura, Sheka, Mayi-Mayi Yakatumba, Raia Mutomboki and UPCP. Some are "community self-help" groups that have legitimate grievances that they would like the Congolese government to address; others are remnants of foreign military outfits that seek to use the Congo as a launch-hub for attacks on other nations; while others could be characterised as scavengers. Alliances are always being forged and broken, sometimes violently, by members of these rebel groups. Thus, it is difficult to make broad generations about their points of view. Further, most of these rebel groups are inept at public relations, and, they are generally marginalized by the research community and the international media because of (logistical constraints and) the fear of legitimizing the rebel groups' respective positions.

By and large, the architects of each lens zealously discount the assertions that are made by the architects of other lenses; regardless of whether there is a modicum of truth in them or not. Otherwise put, their battles to define the popular narrative of the Congo Issue obfuscate its elements. And, this inhibits the formulation of solutions that would create lasting peace and prosperity for the Congolese people.

In this post, I will attempt to amalgamate the competing lenses to produce a holistic snapshot of the Congo issue.

I will start by discussing Rwanda's ancient boarders and the history of the Banyamulenge in the Congo. Secondly, I will discuss the evolution of hostilities towards the Kinyarwanda-speaking people, and, how they were shaped by politicians and the activities of Rwanda-sponsored forces in the Congo. Lastly, I will demonstrate how these hostilities will make it difficult for the Kabila government to address the grievances of the Banyamulenge / Banyarwanda / Kinyarwanda-speaking people.


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"To remain ignorant of things that happened before you were born is to remain a child."
 – Cicero
"History is the witness that testifies to the passing of time; it illumines reality, vitalizes memory, provides guidance in daily life and brings us tidings of antiquity"
 – Cicero
 
Between 1880 and 1895, a Rwandan Chief, or Mwami, called Rabugiri established a unified state with a centralised military structure. As Illustration 2, below, shows, the Rwandan nation that Rabugiri founded overspills into the modern-day territory of Tanzania and the DRC:

Illustration 2 Adapted from: Exploring Africa


Illustration 2 clearly shows that the Old Rwandan kingdom spilled over into the outermost fringes of what is now known as North and South Kivu. In South Kivu, the Old Rwandan kingdom intersected with the Luba kingdom. Therefore, it is reasonable to assert that the sliver of territory that is annotated "This Land" in Illustration 2 is the segment of the modern-day Congo that can (uncontestably) be regarded as part of the Old Rwandan kingdom.
 
In a protest letter that was penned by a Group of Scholars (on Eastern Congo) to the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon, they stated that "the origins of the problem" (i.e. Marginalization of Kinyarwanda-speaking people in the DRC) lay in the "Berlin Conference [where some] Rwandan territories became Congolese". They also recommended for the UN Secretary General to investigate the "pillage" of the Congo by "foreign firms". Interestingly, this letter was quoted and referenced heavily in the Rwandan media (which is state controlled). 

Hence, this indicates that the Rwandan elites endorse its contents; they are unhappy about the marginalization of Kinyarwanda-speaking people in the Congo, and, they are unhappy about the "pillage of the Congo by foreign firms". 

In the latter parts of this post, I will indicate how these two points and the historical boundaries of Rwanda can be used to disincentivize the Rwandan government from sponsoring rebel groups.


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...How did the Kinyarwanda-speaking people come to settle in the Congo?

Illustration 3, below, answers the question that is in the heading of this section:


Illustration 3 (download for a better view)


As Illustration 3 shows, Banyarwanda migration to the DRC was largely push migration; it was generally forced. It occurred during the following time-periods:
  • 1880 to 1895: A small contingent of Banyarwanda (both Tutsi and Hutu) fled to South Kivu in the Congo, after Mwami Rabugiri - the unifier chief that I mentioned in the opening paragraphs, instituted onerous taxes. In the late 1920s, the Tutsi from this contingent were allowed, by the Congo colonial authorities, to occupy a high plateau farther south.
  • 1924 to 1929: Over 7,000 Banyarwanda, i.e. Tutsi and Hutu, arrived in South Kivu in the Congo in search of work.
  • 1959 to 1960: An Influx of Tutsi refugees arrived in South Kivu in the Congo. It had fled the "Social Revolution" in Rwanda that was led by Grégoire Kayibanda.
  • 1971 to 1973: Anti-Hutu massacres occurred in Burundi and revenge anti-Tutsi persecutions occurred in Rwanda. Owing to this, a contingent of Rwandan Tutsi refugees joined the pastoral Tutsi in South Kivu.

In the 1970s, Mobutu Sese Seko's Citizenship Act "compelled" the Banyarwanda to convert their collective name to Banyamulenge. Around this time, the Banyarwanda in South Kivu started to increasingly refer to themselves as the Banya-Tulambo and the Banya-Minembwe, i.e. they named themselves after their "home regions", Tulambo and Minembwe. [5]

In the latter parts of this post, I will return to this point.


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...Major Incidents of Persecution

The major incidents of Tutsi persecution that transpired in the Congo can be abbreviated as follows:
  • 1970s to 1980s: The Congo Citizenship Act of 1971, which was instituted by the Mobutu government, "compelled" the Tutsi to convert their collective identity from Banyarwanda to Banyamulenge; which loosely translates to "People of Mulenge". Naturally, this created tensions between the Tutsi and the Bafuliro people, who were the original inhabitants of Mulenge. 
  • I981: The Nande and Hunde people from North Kivu, i.e. a region in which Tutsi migrants had settled, launched a campaign to strip-away the citizenship of Tutsi that descended from post-1885 migrants from Rwanda.
  • 1985: The "Indigenous" Kivutian majority, i.e. the Nande and Hunde elites, instituted reforms that would restrict Banyarwanda from holding political office.
  • 1993: Bloody conflicts occurred between the Tutsi, Hutu and indigenous populations of the Kivu region. To contain the violence, the Mobutu government sent poorly equipped and corrupt troops. The troops appeared to support the Banyarwanda -- which further aggravated the tensions between them and the other inhabitants of the Kivus.
  • 1993 to 1994: Tensions between the Hutu genocidiares, who had fled into the DRC, and the Tutsi inhabitants of the Kivus started rising.
  • 1994 to 1996: In 1995, Anzuluni Mbembe, the co-speaker of the Parliament of Congo, signed a resolution which stated that all "recent" Banyamulenge refugees would be expelled from the Congo. In addition to this, he compiled a list of "other" Banyamulenge who would be expelled from the country. In 1996, all Banyamulenge who did not obey the-said decree had their property expropriated, and, they were shepherded into refugee camps. In response to this injustice, Banyamulenge militia coalesced to fight the Mobutu government, and, most of them joined the Rwanda-backed ADFL force which was headed by Laurent Kabila.
  • 1998: A war broke-out when Laurent Kabila, who was the President of the Congo at that time, purged Tutsi from the government and ordered Rwandan troops and Banyamulenge to leave the Congo.
  • 2000: Banyamulenge civilians were terrorized by the Mai-Mai, Burundian Forces for the Defense of Democracy and the Rwandan Hutu Armée de Libération du Rwanda (ALiR).


...Sources of Hostility

Immigration is never frictionless. By and large, whenever there is turmoil in host communities, the majority of the blame tends to be apportioned to immigrants. Generally, the higher the degree of linguistic, cultural, physical, and economic differences between the immigrants and their host communities; the greater the blame.

Hence, it is reasonable to assert that tensions between the Banyarwanda and the indigenous groups were ever-present, and, that they tended to intensify in times of communal turmoil. 

In the absence of communal integration initiatives that would foster mutual respect and understanding, these tensions only festered and spawned incidents of violence between 'in-groups' and 'out-groups'.

The earliest record of hostilities between the Banyarwanda and indeginous populations in the Kivus can be found in the 1964 to 1965 period. In 1964, Banyamulenge in the DRC joined the Simba Rebellion that sought to depose Mobutu Sese Seko. 

However, they switched sides and joined pro-Mobutu Sese Seko forces when the Simba rebels stole their cattle. The neighbouring Bembe group, who were on the pro-rebel side, suffered heavy losses because of this loss of Banyarwanda support. This created inter-group tensions. 

As I stated elsewhere, between the 1970s and the 1980s, the Banyarwanda converted their collective identity to Banyamulenge, which loosely translates to "People of Mulenge". Naturally, this escallated the tensions between the Banyarwanda and the Bafuliro people (who were the original inhabitants of Mulenge).

It is important to note that the anti-Banyarwanda sentiment in the DRC was largely confined to the eastern regions of the country. And, it only cropped-up in other parts of the country when the Congolese learnt, from Burundian Hutu immigrants, of the callous atrocities that were committed by the Tutsi-elites that controlled Burundi between 1971 and 1973.

It is also important to note that the Mobutu government used a divide and conquer strategy that magnified and exploited this anti-Banyarwanda sentiment. However, it is important to also stress that most Congolese citizens, outside the Kivus, had never encountered Banyarwanda, and thus, they did not harbour any hostilities towards them. 

Otherwise put: it is in recent times that these tensions grew.

The tensions that occurred in recent times can be abbreviated as follows:
  • 1996 to 1998: Banyamulenge militia were fomed to fight the Mobutu government, and, a large contingent of the Banyamulenge joined the Rwanda-backed ADFL force which was headed by Laurent Kabila. The ADFL conducted “ Rwandan genocide revenge” killings in South Kivu; Hutu refugees (and militia) and many indigenous Congolese civilians were massacred. This created a strong anti-Tutsi sentiment on the path that the ADFL blazed (on its way to Kinshasa). When Laurent Kabila came into power, he used his force of Banyarwanda child soldiers, referred to as kadogos, from the Kivus to police Kinshasa. They tended to bludgeon people for 'offenses' like wearing short skirts, and, they largely infringed upon the civil liberties of the Congolese people. This magnified the anti-Banyarwanda sentiment in the DRC to levels that were heretofore unseen. Further, around that time, there was also a strong presence of Rwandan forces in the DRC. Congolese citizens generally did not appreciate their presence, and this culminated in an anti-Rwanda / anti-Tutsi parade that was led by Tshala Muana. Jason Stearns's narrative of the parade captures the intense toxicity of the anti-Tutsi sentiment that saturated Kinshasa, and I quote: "Tshala Mwana, a famous singer and allegedly the president’s mistress, led the parade dressed in white, tugging two goats on a leash with signs identifying them as Deo Bugera and Bizima Karaha, the two most famous Tutsi in Kabila’s government who had defected to join the rebellion. Some of the marchers brandished signs [that read]: 'We will make Rwanda the twelfth province of the Congo,' and 'No to Tutsi expansion in the DRC and Africa.'  As the cheering crowd looked on, the famous, brawny wrestler Edingwe—he could often be seen jogging and singing with his followers along the Kinshasa streets at dawn—stepped up and slit the animals’ throats".
  • 1998 to 2003: The Rwandan-backed RCD force (that invaded the Congo after the Rwandans were expelled by Laurent Kabila) was met with the resistance of Kabila-backed "ethnic self-defence groups" (that were fighting against "foreign aggression"). The RCD's response to the resistance was to massacre the civilian populations that spawned these groups. Naturally, these massacres elevated the anti-Rwanda / anti-Tutsi sentiment in the DRC to stratospheric levels.
  • 1999-2000: In 1999, the allegiance between Rwanda and Uganda became strained. They fought close to three battles on the streets of the diamond-rich city of Kisangani. In these battles, thousands of innocent Congolese civilians lost their lives. Between 1997 and 1999, Uganda's official exports of diamonds grew by a factor of ten, from USD198,000 to USD1.8 million. Further, between 1998 and 2000, Rwanda’s official exports of diamonds also grew from USD6,000 to USD1.7 million. Interestingly enough, Uganda and Rwanda have no known diamond reserves of their own [2]. Naturally, most Congolese citizens have explanations for where Uganda and Rwanda's diamond wealth came from. The common thread that runs across the explanations is: Kisangani.

Hence, it is reasonable to assert that Rwanda's expeditions in the Congo have made a disproportionately large contribution to the anti-Tutsi sentiment in the Congo. 


 ...Kabila's Constraint

In the run-up to the 2006 Congolese presidential election, Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo ran under the slogan: "One hundred percent Congolese". He portrayed Joseph Kabila as a "stooge" of the Rwandan government. Further, Bemba's surrogates used imagery like Illustration 4, a picture of Joseph Kabila and Paul Kagame "on the training grounds" before the first Congo war, to give his message credibility and resonance:


Illustration 4 (click on illustration to zoom in)


In 2010, a tripartite agreement between the DRC, UNHCR and Rwanda, was concluded. Under the terms of the agreement, the parties to the agreement would oversee the repatriation of 55,000 Banyamulenge refugees (who were living in refugee camps in Rwanda).

When the first contingents of repatriated refugees arrived in the Congo, Kabila's detractors resumed whispering the "stooge" rhetoric. This rhetoric resonated among Congolese citizens who feared that their government was smuggling-in Rwandans [3] [5]. Understandably, these fears and the "stooge" rhetoric inevitably weakened Kabila's resolve to address the grievances of the Banyamulenge.

As everyone now appreciates, Mobutu Sese Seko was a tribalist who only cared about the welfare of his Ngbandi tribe. Otherwise put, it is reasonable to assert that 250 (out of the close to 251 tribes in the Congo) have got longstanding grievances that they would like the Kabila government to address.

Thus, it should come as no surprise that when the Kabila government tried to address the grievances of the Banyamulenge, he was accused (by some tribes) of favouritism. Understandably, this, again, weakened Kabila's resolve to address the grievances of the Banyamulenge.

In short, Kabila is damned if he does and damned if he doesn't.

To incentivize him to address the grievances of the Banyamulenge, it is of critical importance to: 1) Acknowledge this fact, and; 2) Formulate a peace plan that would minimize the fallout of addressing the grievances of the Banyamulenge.


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...Creating Lasting Peace

To create lasting peace, the Kabila government would need to do the following:
  1. Acknowledge that the boarders of the Old Rwandan kingdom spilled into the Congo, as Illustration 2 shows, and, give the Rwandan government and its partners, the exclusive rights to exploit the minerals in that spill-over region, especially the territory that is labelled "This Land" in Illustration 2 under an equitable perpetual joint venture agreement (with the local communities). [This measure would give the Rwandan government a strong incentive to foster the stability of the Congo]. Each member of the local communities should have a stake in the mining ventures that enables him / her to earn a monthly cash stream which is multiples of the Congolese per capita income and minimum wage. This, would, in effect: help to address the grievances of the other tribes in the Congo; foster the development of trust between the Congolese and Rwandans, and; absolve the Kabila government of favouritism allegations when it moves to repatriate Banyamulenge. The peace agreement should have a phrase that says something to the effect of: "The Rwandan equity stake portion of the ventures would be expropriated if there is credible evidence that the Rwandan government is supporting mutineers, rebels or foreign invading forces that seek to destabilize the Congo".
  2. Stipulate, in the peace agreement, that the reparations that would be made to the Banyamulenge would occur in the form of direct cash transfers to them. And, that these transfers would be made by Rwandan mining ventures that would be operating in the Congo. These expenditures could be deducted from the tax bills of the-said Rwandan mining firms. (I won't disclose my reasons for suggesting this).
  3. Address the grassroots grievances of the Banyamulenge and their neighbouring communities, particularly the communities that they had altercations with e.g. the Bafuliro and the Bembe tribes.
  4. Repatriate the refugees after steps 1 to 3 have been completed.



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The human cost of the internecine conflict in the Congo has been too great; 5 million people have lost their lives, others remain displaced and young women continue to be violated in the most savage ways. Rwanda is not entirely responsible for all of these atrocities; there are countless rebel groups that operate in the Congo.

However, a growing body of evidence shows that the Rwandan elites played, and continue to play, a pivotal role in propagating the major conflicts that plunge the Congo into a deeper state of anarchy. [4]

In this post, I have demonstrated that these conflicts have contributed to the meteoric rise of the anti-Tutsi sentiment in the DRC.

Clearly, it is not in Rwanda's interests to continue to support armed conflict in the Congo.



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[1] There is an element of truth in all the narratives - every single one of them!
[2] Source: Report of the United Nations Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2001/ 357, United Nations, April 12, 2001, 21.
[3] Source: Report from the Rift Valley Institute's Usalama Project titled From CNDP to M23: The Evolution of an armed Movement in Eastern Congo
[4] Criticism of the "foreign ventures" of Rwandan elites does not imply hostility towards Rwandan civilians.
[5] Between 1970 and 2012, the Congo's population grew at a mean rate of 3.065% per year. Therefore the total Banyamulenge population (i.e. Banyamulenge currently living in the DRC and Banyamulenge in the refugee camps in neighbouring countries) should approximately be equal to the total population of Banyamulenge in the Congo in 1970 with a mean growth rate of 3.065% per year.